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DAD Knows Best: NPS Optimization Warriors Simulate ‘Perfect’ Enemies to Defend Critical
Infrastructure
Wednesday, January 03, 2007
Story by Barbara Honegger, Senior Military Affairs Journalist  
Naval Postgraduate School faculty and students are modeling worst-case attacks on the nation’s critical
infrastructure to identify key vulnerabilities and plan optimal defenses.  
"The question we’re answering is, 'Where do we best spend limited funds to harden our critical national
infrastructure?’ with the goal of getting to the point that, no matter what our adversaries do, they can't
significantly hurt us," explained NPS operations research Prof. R. Kevin Wood, a key faculty researcher
in the area.  "But to defend something, you have to first learn how to attack it, and you do that by
modeling where and how an optimal attacker would strike."
The Department of Homeland Security has officially designated 13
critical infrastructure sectors that are the focus of such studies: 
agriculture, water, emergency services, the defense industrial
base, energy, banking and finance, postal and shipping, food,
public health, government, information and telecommunications,
transportation and the chemical industry. 
"Because we don't know where terrorists are going to strike electric
power grids, airports or oil pipelines, we don't want to use risk
models where we have to guess which attacks will happen or are
most likely,” he said.   “Instead, we determine where and how a
fully informed enemy -- one who knows everything about our
systems and how they operate -– would use his limited resources
to attack to inflict the most damage.  Then we add a new level of
analysis to learn how to best pre-defend against such worst-case
attacks.  We’ve built models, for example, that define all possible
scenarios for five near-simultaneous attacks on a power grid; and
we’ve answered questions like, ‘If you want to minimize the
maximum time to detect a nuclear, biological or chemical attack in
a subway system and can only afford three detectors, where do
you place them?’”  
Wood and his NPS colleagues and students specialize in this far more complex  third level of
mathematical analysis.  
"Bi-level -- that is, two-level -- optimization models can implicitly analyze the effects of thousands or even
millions of possible 'red team' attacks against an infrastructure to reveal which would be the most
damaging,” Wood noted.  “We call these two-level attacker-defender (AD) models that help us identify
system vulnerabilities ADs.  In an AD, the defender is really just a victim; after being attacked, he simply
observes the results and operates his damaged system as best he can.  But we can add a third level to
create a defender-attacker-defender model, or DAD, which lets us plan an optimal, proactive defense.  If
you measure success in terms of minimizing damage from worst-case attacks, you need this third level of
a DAD, which reveals where to apply limited defensive resources to reach that goal.   
“Bi-level ADs are already hard to solve," Wood stressed, “but the third decision level in a DAD makes it
an even tougher nut to crack.  DADs require innovative theory and new algorithms to solve, and that’s
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an even tougher nut to crack.  DADs require innovative theory and new algorithms to solve, and that’s
exactly what we’re developing here at NPS.”
NPS Operations Research (OR) Department faculty and students are incorporating the theory and
algorithms for bi- and tri-level models into decision support systems to make these cutting-edge methods
available to key decision makers.
In a project sponsored by the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice and Energy, for example,
Wood and Associate Prof. Javier Salmeron have developed the Vulnerablity of Electric Grids Analyzer
(VEGA) to study regional electric power grids, identify grid vulnerabilities and make suggestions for cost-
effective remediation.   
“With VEGA we’ve looked at real U.S. power systems," Wood stressed.  “It might identify a set of
substations whose operations are the most critical to keeping customers supplied with power, and can
compare the benefit of hardening those substations against attack to the benefit of adding new power
lines and redundant circuits to bypass them if damaged.  System operators already mathematically
optimize a grid’s power generation and dispatch continuously, but we’ve extended that math to account
for attacks and defensive actions that will mitigate the effects of attacks.”  
NPS operations analysis student and submariner Lt. Robert Rose is doing his master’s thesis on
defending electric power grids.  
“My research on limiting the amount of disruption should an attack occur is extremely challenging,” Rose
said, “because even relatively small electric networks have almost endless defense-attack
combinations.” 
Spanish Navy Lt. Cmdr. Pablo Alvarez San Martin, an operations research (OR) student, is using tri-level
models in his thesis research.  
“The NPS optimizers’ integrated approach to protecting critical infrastructure is very important and one of
the main reasons my sponsor, the Spanish Navy, has been sending officers to the OR master’s program
here for many years,” said Spanish Navy Lt. Cmdr. Pablo Alvarez San Martin, a student in operations
analysis.  “The military, in Spain at least, normally thinks in terms of protecting high-value military assets
rather than including them in optimally defending a complete infrastructure system.  I’m especially
interested in tri-level models by which we are able to know, given specified available resources, the best
way to defend a network.”  Upon graduating, Alvarez San Martin will report to the operations research
department at Spanish Naval Headquarters.  
Wood, Salmeron and Ross Baldick’s key paper on defending electric power grids, “Analysis of Electric
Grid Security Under Terrorist Threat,” was published in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.  
Students in the OR Department’s networks course have also analyzed rail systems in Asia, border
security in Arizona, the electric power grid in South Carolina, strategic road and rail networks, domestic
water systems, sea lanes, canals, multi-commodity supply chains, petroleum distribution networks and
economic warfare, among other topics.  
"The same mathematical theory and models can be applied to optimizing our missile defense," Wood
noted.  "The Naval Warfare Command is funding NPS to develop a new Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
planning system based on bi-level and tri-level models.  In this case, we are beginning with a defender-
attacker model and extending that to a DAD.  The purpose is to position anti-ballistic missile platforms,
like Aegis cruisers, in the best combinations of locations to defend against an emergent threat.”  
Wood, operations research Profs. Gerald Brown and Matt Carlyle, project leader Senior Lecturer Jeff
Kline and master’s student Lt. Douglas Diehl published a paper on this topic, "A Two-Sided Optimization
for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,” in the journal Operations Research.  
Some key lessons learned by the NPS critical infrastructure protection team are: contrary to classical
military theory, the attacker has the advantage; systems vary widely in robustness; hardening
infrastructure can be expensive; system data and system vulnerability data are available on the Internet
and other open sources; the most damaging attacks, and most effective defenses, are often non-intuitive;
coordinated hostile attacks can be far more damaging than natural disasters like earthquakes or
hurricanes; the right redundancy can be the solution; and deception and secrecy can be helpful for
defense.   
An overview article by Wood, Brown, Carlyle and Salmeron on defending critical infrastructure will be
published in a special issue of Interfaces, a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and
Management Science (INFORMS).  A tutorial they presented at the society’s November 2005
conference, "Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack, and Planning Defenses," was
published in its Tutorials in Operations Research: Emerging Theory, Methods and Applications.  The
papers present specific examples of applying ADs and DADs to infrastructure protection problems,
including defending the Washington, D.C. metro system from  nuclear, biological or chemical attacks;
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including defending the Washington, D.C. metro system from  nuclear, biological or chemical attacks;
hardening the Strategic Petroleum Reserve against physical attacks; improving security at the Los
Angeles International Airport’s Terminal One; and analyzing the vulnerability of the Saudi oil pipeline
system to attack.
Current sponsors of Naval Postgraduate School research on critical infrastructure protection include the
Office of Naval Research, the Department of Energy and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. 
U.S. Northern Command is also sponsoring NPS thesis research in the area.  
For more information on NPS research on protecting critical infrastructure, contact Wood at
kwood@nps.edu, (831) 656-2523.
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